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Storage of biometric data requires some form of template protection in order to preserve the privacy of people enrolled in a
biometric database. One approach is to use a Helper Data System. Here it is necessary to transform the raw biometric measurement
into a fixed-length representation. In this paper we extend the spectral function approach of Stanko and Sˇkoric´ [18], which provides
such a fixed-length representation for fingerprints. First, we introduce a new spectral function that captures different information
from the minutia orientations. It is complementary to the original spectral function, and we use both of them to extract information
from a fingerprint image. Second, we construct a helper data system consisting of zero-leakage quantisation followed by the Code
Offset Method. We show empirical data which demonstrates that applying our helper data system causes only a small performance
penalty compared to fingerprint authentication based on the unprotected spectral functions.
Index Terms—Biometrics, fingerprint recognition, template protection, minutiae.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Biometric template protection
Biometric authentication has become popular because of its
convenience. Biometrics cannot be forgotten or left at home.
Although biometric data is not exactly secret (we are leaving
a trail of fingerprints, DNA etc.), it is important to protect
biometric data for privacy reasons. Unprotected storage of
biometric data could reveal medical conditions and would
allow cross-matching of entries in different databases. Large-
scale availability of unprotected biometric data would make
it easier for malevolent parties to leave misleading traces at
crime scenes (e.g. artificial fingerprints [13], synthesized DNA
[8].) One of the easiest ways to properly protect a biomet-
ric database against breaches and insider attacks (scenarios
where the attacker has access to decryption keys) is to store
biometrics in hashed form, just like passwords. An error-
correction step has to be added to get rid of the measurement
noise. To prevent critical leakage from the error correction
redundancy data, one uses a Helper Data System (HDS)
[11], [5], [17], for instance a Fuzzy Extractor or a Secure
Sketch [10], [6], [3]. The best known and simplest HDS
scheme is the code-offset method (COM). The COM utilizes
a linear binary error-correction code and thus requires a fixed-
length representation of the biometric measurement. Such a
representation is not straightforward when the measurement
noise can cause features of the biometric to appear/disappear.
For instance, some minutiae may not be detected in every
image captured from the same finger.
A fixed-length representation called spectral minutiae was
introduced by Xu et al. [24], [21], [22], [23]. For every
detected minutia of sufficient quality, the method evaluates a
Fourier-like spectral function on a fixed-size two-dimensional
grid; the contributions from the different minutiae are added
up. Disappearance of minutiae or appearance of new ones does
not affect the size of this representation.
One of the drawbacks of Xu et al.’s construction is that phase
information is discarded in order to obtain translation invari-
ance. Nandakumar [14] proposed a variant which does not
discard the phase information. However, it reveals personalised
reliability data, which makes it difficult to use in a privacy-
preserving scheme.
A minutia-pair based variant of Xu et al.’s technique was
introduced in [18]. It has a more compact grid and reduced
computation times. Minutia pairs (and even triplets) were used
in [7], [9], but with a different attacker model that allows
encryption keys to exist that are not accessible to the attacker.
B. Contributions and outline
First we extend the pair-based spectral minutiae method [18]
by introducing a new spectral function that captures different
information from the minutia orientations. Then we use the
spectral functions as the basis for a template protection system.
Our HDS consists of two stages. In the first stage, we discretise
the analog spectral representation using a zero-leakage HDS
[5], [17]. This first HDS reduces quantisation noise, and the
helper data reveals no information about the quantised data.
Discretisation of the spectral functions typically yields only
one bit per grid point. We concatenate the discrete data from
all the individual grid points into one long bitstring. In the
second stage we apply the Code Offset Method. Our code of
choice is a Polar code, because Polar code are low-complexity
capacity-achieving codes with flexible rate.
We present False Accept vs. False Reject tradeoffs at various
stages of the data processing. We introduce the ‘superfinger’
enrollment method, in which we average the spectral func-
tions from multiple enrollment images. By combining three
enrollment images in this way, and constructing a polar code
specifically tuned to the individual bit error rate of each bit
position, we achieve an Equal Error Rate around 1% for a
high-quality fingerprint database, and around 6% for a low-
quality database.
The outline of the paper is as follows. In Section II we intro-
duce notation briefly review helper data systems, the spectral
minutiae representation, and polar codes. In Section III we
introduce the new spectral function. In Section IV we explain
our experimental approach and motivate certain design choices
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2such as the number of discretisation intervals and the use
of a Gaussian approximation. We introduce two methods for
averaging enrollment images.
Section V contains our results, mostly in the form of ROC
curves. In Section VI we discuss the results and identify topics
for future work.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation and terminology
We use capitals to represent random variables, and lowercase
for their realizations. Sets are denoted by calligraphic font.
The set S is defined as S = {0, . . . , N − 1}. The mutual
information (see e.g. [4]) between X and Y is I(X;Y ). The
probability density function (pdf) of the random variable X ∈
R in written as f(x) and its cumulative distribution function
(cdf) as F (x). We denote the number of minutiae found in
a fingerprint by Z. The coordinates of the j’th minutia are
xj = (xj , yj) and its orientation is θj . We write x = (xj)Zj=1
and θ = (θj)Zj=1 We will use the abbreviations FRR = False
Reject Rate, FAR = False Accept Rate, EER = Equal Error
Rate, ROC = Receiver Operating Characteristic. Bitwise xor
of binary strings is denoted as ⊕.
B. Helper Data Systems
A HDS is a cryptographic primitive that allows one to repro-
ducibly extract a secret from a noisy measurement. A HDS
consist of two algorithms: Gen (generation) and Rec (recon-
struction), see Fig. 1. The Gen algorithm takes a measurement
X as input and generates the secret S and a helper data W .
The Rec algorithm has as input a noisy measurement Y and
the helper data; it outputs an estimator Sˆ. If Y is sufficiently
close to X then Sˆ = S. The helper data should not reveal
much about S. Ideally it holds that I(W ;S) = 0. This is
known as Zero Leakage helper data.
Fig. 1: Data flow in a generic Helper Data System.
C. Two-stage HDS template protection scheme
Fig. 2 shows the two-stage HDS architecture mentioned in
Section I-B. The enrollment measurement x is transformed
to the spectral representation (xi)Mi=1 on M grid points. The
first-stage enrollment procedure Gen1 is applied to each xi
individually, yielding short (mostly one-bit) secrets si and
zero-leakage helper data wi. The s1 . . . sM are concatentated
into a string k. Residual noise in k is dealt with by the second-
stage HDS (Code Offset Method), whose Gen2 produces a
secret c and helper data r. A hash h(c||z) is computed, where
z is salt. The hash and the salt are stored.
In the verification phase, the noisy y is processed as shown in
the bottom half of Fig. 2. The reconstructed secret cˆ is hashed
with the salt z; the resulting hash is compared to the stored
hash.
D. Minutia-pair spectral representation
Minutiae are special features in a fingerprint, e.g. ridge endings
and bifurcations. We briefly describe the minutia-pair spectral
representation introduced in [18]. For minutia indices a, b ∈
{1, . . . , Z} the distance and angle between these minutiae are
given by Rab = |xa − xb| and tanφab = ya−ybxa−xb . The spectral
function Mxθ is defined as
Mxθ(q,R) =
Z∑
a=1
Z∑
b=a+1
eiqφabe−
(R−Rab)2
2σ2 ei(θb−θa), (1)
where σ is a width parameter. The spectral function is evalu-
ated on a discrete (q,R) grid. The variable q is integer and can
be interpreted as the Fourier conjugate of an angular variable,
i.e. a harmonic. The function Mxθ is invariant under transla-
tions of x. When a rotation of the whole fingerprint image is
applied over an angle δ, the spectral function transforms in a
simple way,
Mxθ(q,R)→ eiqδMxθ(q,R). (2)
E. Zero Leakage Helper Data Systems
We briefly review the ZLHDS developed in [5], [17] for
quantisation of an enrollment measurement X ∈ R. The
density function of X is f , and the cumulative distribution
function is F . The verification measurement is Y . The X and
Y are considered to be noisy versions of an underlying ‘true’
value. They have zero mean and variance σ2X , σ
2
Y , respectively.
The correlation between X and Y can be characterised by
writing Y = λX + V , where λ ∈ [0, 1] is the attenuation
parameter and V is zero-mean noise independent of X , with
variance σ2V . It holds that σ
2
Y = λσ
2
X + σ
2
V . We consider
the identical conditions case: the amount of noise is the same
during enrollment and reconstruction. In this situation we have
σ2X = σ
2
Y and λ
2 = 1− σ2V
σ2X
.
The real axis R is divided into N intervals Aα = (Ωα,Ωα+1),
with α ∈ S, S = {0, . . . , N −1}. Let pα = Pr[X ∈ Aα]. The
quantisation boundaries are given by Ωα = F inv(
∑α−1
j=0 pj).
The Gen algorithm produces the secret s as s = max{α ∈
S : x ≥ Ωα} and the helper data w ∈ [0, 1) as w = [F (x)−∑s−1
j=0 pj ]/ps. The inverse relation, for computing x as a
function of s and w, is given by ξs,w = F inv(
∑s−1
j=0 pj+wps).
The Rec algorithm computes the estimator sˆ as the value
in S for which it holds that y ∈ (τsˆ,w, τsˆ+1,w), where the
parameters τ are decision boundaries. In the case of Gaussian
noise these boundaries are given by
τα,w = λ
ξα−1,w + ξα,w
2
+
σ2V ln
pα−1
pα
λ(ξα,w − ξα−1,w) . (3)
Here it is understood that ξ−1,w = −∞ and ξN,w = ∞,
resulting in τ0,w = −∞, τN,w =∞.
The above scheme ensures that I(W ;S) = 0 and that the
reconstruction errors are minimized.
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Fig. 2: Two-stage Helper Data System.
F. The Code Offset Method (COM)
We briefly describe how the COM is used as a Secure Sketch.
Let C be a linear binary error correcting code with message
space {0, 1}m and codewords in {0, 1}n. It has an encoding
Enc: {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n, a syndrome function Syn: {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n−m and a syndrome decoder SynDec: {0, 1}n−m →
{0, 1}n. In Fig. 2 the Gen2 computes the helper data r as
r = Syn k. The c in Fig. 2 is equal to k. The Rep2 computes
the reconstruction kˆ = k′ ⊕ SynDec(r ⊕ Syn k′).
G. Polar codes
Polar codes, proposed by Arıkan [2], are a class of linear
block codes that get close to the Shannon limit even at small
code length. They are based on the repeated application of the
polarisation operation
(
1 0
1 1
)
on two bits of channel input.
Applying this operation creates two virtual channels, one of
which is better than the original channel and one worse. For
n channel inputs, repeating this procedure in the end yields
m near-perfect virtual channels, with m/n close to capacity,
and n −m near-useless channels. The m-bit message is sent
over the good channels, while the bad ones are ‘frozen’, i.e
used to send a fixed string known a priori by the recipient.
The most popular decoder is the Successive Cancellation
Decoder (SCD), which sequentially estimates message bits
(ci)
m
i=1 according to the frozen bits and the previously esti-
mated bits cˆi−1. Polar codes have been recently adopted for the
next generation wireless standard (5G), especially for control
channels, which have short block length (≤ 1024).
III. A NEW SPECTRAL FUNCTION
Consider Fig. 3 (modified from [20]). The invariant angle βa
is defined as the angle from the orientation of minutia a to the
connecting line ab, taken in the positive direction. (The βb is
defined analogously). Modulo 2pi it holds that θa + βa = φab
and θb+βb = φab+pi. The spectral function (1) uses only the
invariant angle βa − βb + pi = θb − θa. The second invariant
angle, which can be written e.g. as pi − βa − βb = θa + θb −
2φab, is not used. We therefore now introduce a new spectral
function, denoted as Mxβ , which incorporates the invariant
angle pi − βa − βb.
Mxβ(q,R) =
Z∑
a=1
Z∑
b=a+1
eiφab(q−2)e−
(R−Rab)2
2σ2 ei(θb+θa). (4)
We will use Mxθ, Mxβ and their fusion.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH
A. Databases
We use the MCYT, FVC2000, and FVC2002 database. The
MCYT database [15] contains good-quality images from 100
individuals: 10 fingers per individual and 12 images per finger.
FVC2000 and FVC2002 contain low-quality images (only
index and middle fingers [12]). Each FVC database contains
100 fingers, 8 images per finger. In FVC2002, images number
3, 4, 5, and 6 have an exceptionally large angular displacement,
so they are omitted from the experiments.
We extract the minutia position and orientation (xj , yj , θj)
by using VeriFinger software [1]. For MCYT we evaluate
the spectral functions on the same grid as [18], namely
R ∈ {16, 22, 28, . . . , 130} and q ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 16} and we
maintain σ = 2.3 pixels. For the FVC databases we use the
same grid, and σ = 3.2 pixels turns out to be a good choice.
The average number of minutiae that can be reliably found is
Z = 35.
Fig. 3: The relevant angles in a minutia pair.
4B. No image rotation
As mentioned in [18], during the reconstruction procedure
one can try different rotations of the verification image, but
it results only in a minor improvement of the EER. For this
reason we do not apply image rotation.
C. Quantization methods
Before quantization all spectral functions are normalized to
zero mean and unit variance, where the variance is taken of
the real and imaginary part together. We quantize the real
and imaginary part of the spectral functions separately. We
study two methods: ‘hard thresholding’ (without helper data)
and the Zero Leakage quantisation of Section II-B. The hard
thresholding gives a bit value ‘1’ if ReM > 0 and ‘0’
otherwise. We will show results for this method mainly to
demonstrate the advantages of Zero Leakage quantisation.
D. Gaussian probability distributions
When using the ZLHDS formulas we will assume that the
spectral functions are Gaussian-distributed. Figs. 4 and 5 il-
lustrate that this assumption is not far away from the truth.1
Fig. 4: Histogram of ReMxθ, and a fitted Gaussian.
Fig. 5: Histogram of ImMxθ, and a fitted Gaussian.
1 Note that we often see correlations between the real and imaginary part.
This has no influence on the ZLHDS.
E. Zero leakage quantization
1) Signal to noise ratio; setting N
In the ZL HDS of Section II-E, the optimal choice of the
parameter N (number of quantization intervals) depends on
the signal to noise ratio. Fig. 6 shows a comparison between
N = 2 and N = 3. At low noise it is obvious that N = 3
extracts more information from the source than N = 2. At
σV /σX larger than approximately 0.3, there is a regime where
N = 3 can extract more in theory, but is hindered in practice
by the high bit error rate. At σV /σX > 0.55 the N = 2 ‘wins’
in all respects.
Fig. 6: Comparison of ZLHDS with N = 2 versus N = 3.
Lines without markers: Mutual information between the en-
rolled key S and the reconstructed key Sˆ given helper data W ,
as a function of σV /σX . Markers: bit error rate as a function
of σV /σX . The curves follow equations (22) and (26) from
[18].
For our data set, we define a σ2X(q,R) for every grid point
(q,R) as the variance of M(q,R) over all images in the
database. The noise σ2V (q,R) is the variance over all available
images of the same finger, averaged over all fingers.
Figs. 7 and 8 show the noise-to-signal ratio. Note the large
amount of noise; even the best grid points have σV /σX >
0.45. Fig. 6 tells us that setting N = 2 is the best option, and
this is the choice we make. At N = 2 we extract two bits per
grid point from each spectral function (one from ReM, one
from ImM). Hence our bit string string k (see Fig. 2) derived
from Mxθ has length 640. When we apply fusion of Mxθ
and Mxβ this becomes 1280.
For N = 2 the formulas in Section II-E simplify to A0 =
(−∞, 0), A1 = [0,∞), p0 = p1 = 12 , ξ0,w = F inv(w2 ),
ξ1,w = F
inv( 12 +
w
2 ), τ1,w =
λ
2 (ξ0,w + ξ1,w). Since we work
with Gaussian distributions, F is the Gaussian cdf (‘probability
function’).
2) Enrollment and reconstruction
We have experimented with three different enrollment meth-
ods:
E1. A single image is used.
E2: We take the first2 t images of a finger and calculate
the average spectral function. We call this the ‘superfinger’
2 We take the first t images to show that the approach works. We are not
trying to optimise the choice of images.
5Fig. 7: Sorted noise-to-signal ratio of Mxθ for different
databases.
Fig. 8: Sorted noise-to-signal ratio of Mxβ for different
databases.
method. In the ZLHDS calculations the signal-to-noise ratio
of the average spectral function is used.
E3: For each of t images we calculate an enrollment string k.
We apply bitwise majority voting on these strings. (This
requires odd t.) The reconstruction boundaries are calculated
based on the superfinger method, i.e. as in E2.
Reconstruction:
We study fingerprint authentication with genuine pairs and
impostor pairs. For pedagogical reasons we will present results
at each stage of the signal processing: (1) spectral function
domain, before quantisation; (2) binarized domain, without
HDS; (3) with ZLHDS; (4) with ZLHDS and discarding the
highest-noise grid points.
In the spectral function domain the fingerprint matching is
done via a correlation score [18]. In the binarized domain we
look at the Hamming weight between the enrolled k and the
reconstructed kˆ. For all cases we will show ROC curves in
order to visualise the FAR-FRR tradeoff as a function of the
decision threshold.
Let the number of images per finger be denoted as M , and
the number of fingers in a database as L .
E1: For the spectral domain and the quantization without HDS
we compare all genuine pairs, i.e.
(
M
2
)
image pairs per finger,
resulting in L
(
M
2
)
data points. For ZLHDS the number is twice
as large, since there is an asymmetry between enrollment and
reconstruction. For the FVC databases we generate all possible
impostor combinations (all images of all impostor fingers),
resulting in O(M2L2) data points.
For the MCYT database, which is larger, we take only one
random image per impostor finger, resulting in O(ML2) data
points.
E2+E3: For genuine pairs we compare the superfinger to the
remaining M− t images. Thus we have (M− t)L data points.
Impostor pairs are generated as for E1.
Note: The VeriFinger software was not able to extract infor-
mation for every image.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. FAR/FRR rates before error correction
For each the data processing steps/options before application
of the Code Offset method, we investigate the False Accept
rates and False Reject rates. We identify a number of trends.
• Figs. 9 and 10 show ROC curves. All the non-analog curves
were made under the implicit assumption that for each
decision threshold (number of bit flips) an error-correcting
code can be constructed that enforces that threshold, i.e.
decoding succeeds only if the number of bit flips is below
the threshold. Unsurprisingly, we see in the figures that
quantisation causes a performance penalty. Furthermore the
penalty is clearly less severe when the ZLHDS is used.
Finally, it is advantageous to discard some grid points
that have bad signal-to-noise ratio. For the curves labeled
‘ZLHDS+reliable components’ only the least noisy3 512
bits of k were kept (1024 in the case of fusion). Our choice
for the number 512 is not entirely arbitrary: it fits error-
correcting codes. Note in Fig. 10 that ZLHDS with reliable
component selection performs better than analog spectral
functions without reliable component selection. (But not
better than analog with selection.)
• The E2 and E3 enrollment methods perform better than
E1. Furthermore, performance increases with t. A typical
example is shown in Fig. 11.
• The spectral functions Mxθ and Mxβ individually have
roughly the same performance. Fusion yields a noticeable
improvement. An example is shown in Fig. 12. (We imple-
mented fusion in the analog domain as addition of the two
similarity scores.)
• Tables I to V show Equal Error Rates and Bit Error Rates.
We see that enrollment methods E2 and E3 have similar
performance, with E2 yielding a somewhat lower genuine-
pair BER than E3.
• In Table I it may look strange that the EER in the rightmost
column is sometimes lower than in the ‘analog’ column. We
think this happens because there is no reliable component
selection in the ‘analog’ procedure.
• Ideally the impostor BER is 50%. In the tables we see that
the impostor BER can get lower than 50% when the ZLHDS
is used and the enrollment method is E2. On the other hand,
it is always around 50% in the ‘No HDS’ case. This seems
3 This is defined as a global property of the whole database. The selection
of reliable components does not reveal anything about an individual. Note
that [14] does reveal personalised reliable components and obtains better FA
and FN error rates.
6Fig. 9: Performance result for several processing methods.
FVC2000. Enrollment method E2 with t = 3.
to contradict the Zero Leakage property of the helper data
system. The ZLHDS is supposed not to leak, i.e. the helper
data should not help impostors. However, the zero-leakage
property is guaranteed to hold only if the variables are
independent. In real-life data there are correlations between
grid points and correlations between the real and imaginary
part of a spectral function.
B. Error correction: Polar codes
The error rates in the genuine reconstructed kˆ are rather high,
at least 0.21. In order to apply the Code Offset Method with
a decent message size it is necessary to use a code that has a
high rate even at small codeword length.
Consider the case of fusion ofMxθ andMxβ . The codeword
length is 1280 bits (1024 if reliable component selection is
Fig. 10: Performance result for several processing methods.
MCYT. Enrollment method E2 with t = 3.
performed). Suppose we need to distinguish between 220 users.
Then the message length needs to be at least 20 bits, in spite
of the high bit error rate. Furthermore, the security of the
template protection is determined by the entropy of the data
that is input into the hash function (see Fig. 2); it would be
preferable to have at least 64 bits of entropy.
We constructed a number of Polar codes tuned to the signal-
to-noise ratios of the individual grid points. The codes are
designed to find a set of reliable channels, which are then as-
signed to the information bits. Each code yields a certain FAR
(impostor string accidentally decoding correctly) and FRR
(genuine reconstruction string failing to decode correctly),
and hence can be represented as a point in an ROC plot.
This is shown in Fig. 13. For the MCYT database we have
constructed a Polar code with message length 25 at an EER
around 1.2% (compared to 0.7% before error correction). For
7Fig. 11: Performance effect of the number of images used for
enrollment.
the FVC2000 database we have constructed a Polar code with
message length 15 at an EER around 6% (compared to 3.3%
EER before error correction). Note that the error correction is
an indispensable part of the privacy protection and inevitably
leads to a performance penalty. However, we see that the
penalty is not that bad, especially for high-quality fingerprints.
From our results we also see that even under the best cir-
cumstances (high-quality MCYT database) the entropy of the
extracted string is severely limited (≤25 bits). In order to
achieve a reasonable security level of the hash, at least two
fingers need to be combined. We do not see this as a drawback
of our helper data system; given that the EER for one finger
is around 1%, which is impractical in real-life applications, it
is necessary anyhow to combine multiple fingers.
Fig. 12: Performance of Mxθ and Mxβ individually, and of
their fusion. MCYT database; enrollment method E1; analog
domain.
TABLE I: Equal Error Rates and Bit Error Rates. MCYT
database. Enrollment methods E1 and E2. Numbers displayed
as a percentage are EERs. Numbers without a % sign are
BERs: the left number is for genuine pairs, right for impostors.
#images (t) Analog No HDS ZLHDS ZLHDS+r.c.
1
Mxθ 2.6% 3.7% 3.4% 3.2%0.33 0.50 0.30 0.49 0.29 0.49
Mxβ 2.4% 3.7% 3.4% 3.2%0.33 0.50 0.31 0.50 0.29 0.49
Fusion 2.1% 2.9% 2.6% 2.3%0.33 0.50 0.30 0.49 0.29 0.49
2
Mxθ 2.1% 3.2% 2.3% 2.1%0.33 0.50 0.28 0.46 0.27 0.46
Mxβ 1.7% 3.01% 2.4% 2.2%0.33 0.50 0.28 0.47 0.27 0.47
Fusion 1.6% 2.3% 1.7% 1.4%0.33 0.50 0.28 0.46 0.27 0.47
3
Mxθ 1.4% 2.2% 1.3% 1.1%0.31 0.50 0.24 0.45 0.23 0.46
Mxβ 1.1% 2.0% 1.2% 1.1%0.31 0.50 0.25 0.46 0.23 0.46
Fusion 1.1% 1.5% 0.9% 0.7%0.31 0.50 0.24 0.46 0.23 0.46
4
Mxθ 1.2% 1.7% 1.0% 0.9%0.29 0.50 0.22 0.45 0.21 0.45
Mxβ 1.0% 1.6% 0.9% 0.8%0.30 0.50 0.22 0.45 0.21 0.45
Fusion 0.9% 1.1% 0.6% 0.5%0.30 0.50 0.22 0.45 0.21 0.45
C. Error correction: random codebooks
There is a large discrepancy between the message length of
the Polar code (k ≤ 25) and the known information content of
a fingerprint. According to Ratha et al [16] the reproducible
entropy of a fingerprint image with Z = 35 robustly detectable
minutiae should be more than 120 bits. Furthermore, the
potential message size that can be carried in a 1024-bit string
with a BER of 23% is 1024[1 − h(0.23)] = 227 bits. (And
122 bits at 30% BER.)
We experimented with random codebooks to see if we could
extract more entropy from the data than with polar codes. At
low code rates, a code based on random codewords can be
practical to implement. Let the message size be `, and the
8TABLE II: EERs and BERs for the FVC2000 database.
Enrollment methods E1 and E2.
#images (t) Analog No HDS ZLHDS ZLHDS+r.c.
1
Mxθ 6.0% 9.4% 9.0% 8.0%0.39 0.50 0.37 0.50 0.36 0.50
Mxβ 6.1% 10.4% 9.5% 8.1%0.39 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.37 0.50
Fusion 4.8% 7.3% 6.5% 5.5%0.39 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.36 0.50
2
Mxθ 4.5% 7.2% 5.7% 5.0%0.37 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47
Mxβ 4.8% 7.9% 6.9% 5.6%0.38 0.50 0.34 0.47 0.32 0.47
Fusion 3.9% 5.1% 5.0% 4.1%0.37 0.50 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47
3
Mxθ 3.0% 5.6% 5.3% 4.4%0.36 0.50 0.31 0.46 0.29 0.46
Mxβ 3.2% 7.2% 5.3% 4.9%0.37 0.50 0.32 0.46 0.30 0.46
Fusion 2.2% 4.5% 4.0% 3.3%0.37 0.50 0.32 0.46 0.30 0.46
4
Mxθ 2.1% 5.5% 5.5% 4.8%0.37 0.50 0.31 0.45 0.29 0.45
Mxβ 2.2% 7.1% 6.5% 5.0%0.37 0.50 0.32 0.46 0.30 0.46
Fusion 1.3% 4.3% 4.3% 3.3%0.37 0.50 0.31 0.45 0.30 0.45
TABLE III: EERs and BERs for the FVC2002 database.
Enrollment methods E1 and E2.
#images (t) Analog No HDS ZLHDS ZLHDS+r.c.
1
Mxθ 5.8% 12.1% 10.8% 8.8%0.38 0.50 0.37 0.50 0.36 0.50
Mxβ 6.4% 10.9% 10.9% 9.2%0.39 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.36 0.50
Fusion 5.5% 9.4% 9.3% 7.0%0.39 0.50 0.38 0.50 0.36 0.50
2
Mxθ 5.4% 10.9% 9.8% 7.3%0.39 0.50 0.35 0.48 0.33 0.48
Mxβ 5.5% 10.7% 8.4% 7.4%0.39 0.50 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.48
Fusion 4.4% 9.8% 7.3% 5.9%0.39 0.50 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.48
codeword size m. A random table needs to be stored of size
2` ·m bits, and the process of decoding consists of computing
2` Hamming distances. We split the 1024 reliable bits into
4 groups of m = 256 bits, for which we generated random
codebooks, for various values of `. The total message size is
k = 4` and the total codeword size is n = 4m. The results
are shown in Fig. 13. In short: random codebooks give hardly
any improvement over Polar codes.
VI. SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
A Helper Data System protects privacy but causes a fingerprint
recognition degradation in the form of increased EER. We
have built a HDS from a spectral function representation of
fingerprint data, combined with a Zero Leakage quantisation
scheme. It turns out that our HDS causes only a very small
EER penalty when the fingerprint quality is high.
The best results were obtained with the ‘superfinger’ enroll-
ment method (E2, taking the average over multiple enrollment
TABLE IV: EERs and BERs for the FVC2000 database.
Enrollment method E3.
#images (t) Analog No HDS ZLHDS ZLHDS+r.c.
3
Mxθ 3.0% 5.8% 5.2% 4.2%0.37 0.50 0.36 0.50 0.34 0.50
Mxβ 3.2% 8.1% 6.1% 5.4%0.37 0.50 0.36 0.50 0.35 0.50
Fusion 2.2% 5.3% 4.0% 3.1%0.37 0.50 0.36 0.50 0.34 0.50
TABLE V: EERs and BERs for the MCYT database. Enroll-
ment method E3.
#images (t) Analog No HDS ZLHDS ZLHDS+r.c.
3
Mxθ 1.4% 2.4% 1.6% 1.4%0.31 0.50 0.29 0.49 0.28 0.49
Mxβ 1.1% 2.2% 1.5% 1.4%0.32 0.50 0.30 0.50 0.28 0.50
Fusion 1.1% 1.6% 1.0% 0.9%0.32 0.50 0.30 0.49 0.28 0.50
images in the spectral function domain), and with fusion of
the Mxθ,Mxβ functions. The superfinger method performs
slightly better than the E3 method and also has the advantage
that it is not restricted to an odd number of enrollment
captures.
For the high-quality MCYT database, our HDS achieves an
EER around 1% and extracts a 1024-bit string with ≤ 25 bits
of entropy. In practice multiple fingers need to be used in order
to obtain an acceptable EER. This automatically increases
the entropy of the hashed data. The entropy can be further
increased by employing tricks like the Spammed Code Offset
Method [19].
As topics for future work we mention (i) testing the HDS on
more databases; (ii) further optimisation of parameter choices
such as the number of reliable components, and the number
of minutiae used in the computation of the spectral functions;
(iii) further tweaking of the Polar codes.
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